

# ONLINE APPENDIX

## When Do Withdrawal Threats Achieve Reform in Intergovernmental Organizations?

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Table A1: Descriptive Statistics  
on withdrawal threats accompanied by reform demands (N=52)

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Announce Year	2006.42	11.02	1984	2020
Powerful state	0.50	0.50	0	1
Reform demand	0.58	0.50	0	1
Reform success	0.49	0.44	0	1

Table A2: Regression - Correlates of reform success (treat with caution)

	(1) 3-Level Outcome 0,0.5,1	(2) Binary Outcome 0.5 coded 1	(3) Binary Outcome 0.5 coded 0
Powerful state	0.203 (0.124)	0.200 (0.152)	-0.007 (0.120)
Reform demand	0.369*** (0.115)	0.468*** (0.139)	0.199* (0.109)
Constant	0.176** (0.079)	0.246** (0.104)	0.139* (0.081)
Observations	52	52	52
R-square	0.28	0.31	0.05

*Notes:* OLS models with robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses.

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

## Data Limitations

We caution that our results are suggestive of the dynamics of IGO reform but not conclusive. We outline several data limitations in the coding section of the manuscript and below. We assume that most actual membership withdrawals are preceded by withdrawal threats – yet in many cases we were not able to document these preceding threats. One future research agenda is thus a more comprehensive cataloging of threats in various outlets and through interviews with IGO staff and state representatives.

Our data are limited in several ways. While we began with Lexis Nexis media accounts of withdrawal threats, we researched the context and nuances of the reform demands in IGO meeting notes and archives. Nonetheless, there was not always sufficient detail on the developments after a state makes a withdrawal threat. We note several of these limitations in the article’s research design section.

Second, it is sometimes difficult to parse out when it is the withdrawal threat that is responsible for reform that might have otherwise been happening organically at the same time. For example, in 2011, after shouldering a disproportionate amount of European refugees, Italy threatened to leave the Schengen Agreement if the European Union did nothing to stop illegal immigration. Reform of the Schengen Agreement began by 2013, when signatory members agreed that border controls could be temporarily reintroduced under extraordinary circumstances (such as a serious threat to national security). But these changes were brewing for longer than the immediate withdrawal threat period and sparked by shared concerns across other states particularly in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. We therefore recognize the risk of overdetermined cases but have worked hard to tie any reforms specifically back to the threat of exit (or not) to avoid this equifinality. Relatedly, there may be spurious cases where the withdrawal threat is just one symptom of a much larger problem.

Determining causation rather than just correlation is a substantial inference challenge to which we have attempted to be mindful and transparent. Results remain suggestive. Future work can improve on this with more archival work and interviews with IO staff and country representatives.